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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-STATE COURT JURISDICTION-
QUASI IN REM PROCEEDINGS-The United States Supreme Court has
held that a state's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant by attachment of the contractual obligation of the
defendant's liability insurer, who is licensed to do business in the
forum, is unconstitutional absent other contacts between the defendant
and the forum.
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
On January 13, 1972, two Indiana residents, Jeffrey Savchuk and
Randal Rush, were involved in a single car collision in Elkhart, In-
diana.' The automobile, driven by Rush, was insured under a liability
insurance policy issued in Indiana by State Farm Auto Insurance Com-
pany (State Farm).' Seventeen months after the accident, Savchuk
moved with his parents to Minnesota where he brought suit against
Rush3 alleging negligence and seeking to recover damages' for injuries
suffered in the collision.5 Because Rush had no personal contacts with
Minnesota to justify in personam jurisdiction,6 Savchuk sought to ob-
tain quasi in rem jurisdiction 7 on the basis that Rush's insurer, State
1. 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980).
2. Id. State Farm is an Illinois corporation doing business in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and several Canadian provinces. Id. at 323 n.4.
3. The action against Rush was filed on May 28, 1974. Id. at 322. Savchuk initiated
this action in Minnesota rather than Indiana for two reasons: First, Indiana's guest
statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 9-3-3-1 (Burns 1980), would have barred Savchuk's claim. Id. Sec-
ond, the two-year Indiana statute of limitations had elapsed prior to Savchuk's commence-
ment of this action. 444 U.S. at 322 n.2.
The decision of the Minnesota trial court was not reported.
4. Savchuk in his original complaint sought $125,000 in damages. 444 U.S. at 323.
This was later voluntarily reduced to $50,000, the face value of Rush's liability insurance
policy. Id. at 323 n.5.
5. Id. at 323.
6. In personam jurisdiction is based upon the court's authority over the defendant's
person. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 (1977). A judgment in personam imposes a
personal liability on one person in favor of another. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 1, In-
troductory Note at 5 (1942), quoted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
7. Jurisdiction based upon the court's authority over property is designated in rem
or quasi in rem. 433 U.S. at 199. Strictly speaking, a proceeding in rem is one taken
directly against designated property to determine the interests of all persons therein. At
action quasi in rem is brought to determine the interests of particular persons in
designated property. In one form of quasi in rem action, the plaintiff seeks to satisfy a
claim against the defendant by securing designated property of the defendant. In another
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Farm, did business in Minnesota8 and that State Farm's insurance
obligation9 to Rush was a garnishable res present in Minnesota."°
Following this theory, Savchuk garnished Rush's insurance policy" and
sought to join State Farm, the garnishee, as a party to the action. 2
The Minnesota trial court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction1 3 and granted Savchuk's motion allowing him to join State
Farm by supplemental complaint.'4
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling,'5
determining that an insurance company's obligation to defend and in-
demnify a nonresident under an automobile liability insurance policy is
a garnishable res in Minnesota. Where the plaintiff is a Minnesota resi-
dent at the time of the suit, the policy obligation is sufficient to sustain
quasi in ren jurisdiction over the nonresident even though the ac-
tionable incident occurred outside the forum. 6 The Minnesota court
concluded that the result was fair because in accident litigation the in-
surer, not the insured, controls the defense of the case, and State
Farm, the insurer, did business in and was regulated by the State of
Minnesota."
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 8 the Minnesota
judgment was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of Shaffer v. Heitner.'9 The Supreme Court had held in Shaffer that all
form, the plaintiff seeks to establish his rights vis-a-vis those of the defendant in the
designated property. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, ch. 1, Introductory Note at 6-9 (1942),
quoted in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
8. See note 2 supra.
9. The liability policy issued on the Rush automobile obligated State Farm to defend
and indemnify Rush in any action covered under the policy. 444 U.S. at 322.
10. Id.
11. Service was made upon State Farm by delivery of a copy of the garnishment
summons to the Commissioner of Insurance for Minnesota pursuant to Minnesota law. A
copy of the garnishment summons along with the summons and complaint was served per-
sonally upon Rush in Indiana. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 481, 245 N.W.2d 624, 626
(1976), vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
12. 444 U.S. at 323.
13. Id. at 324. The defendant's motion to dismiss also alleged a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. Id. at 324 n.7.
14. Id. at 324.
15. 311 Minn. at 481, 245 N.W.2d at 626. The court split four to one in favor of
affirming the trial court decision. Id. at 480, 245 N.W.2d at 625.
16. Id. at 485, 245 N.W.2d at 628. The Minnesota court also found this assertion of
jurisdiction to be constitutional because Rush had notice of the suit and an opportunity to
defend. Additionally, his liability was limited to the face amount of his insurance policy
and the garnishment procedure was available only to Minnesota residents. Id. at 488, 245
N.W.2d at 629.
17. Id. at 488, 245 N.W.2d at 629.
18. 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
19. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
Vol. 19:135
Recent Decisions
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be supported by the same
minimum contacts required of in personam jurisdiction."
On remand, the Minnesota Supreme Court21 found that the assertion
of quasi in rem jurisdiction through the garnishment of an insurer's
obligation to an insured complied with the due process standards enun-
ciated by the Shaffer Court.' The Minnesota court determined that the
garnished property was intimately related to the litigation between
Savchuk and Rush.' The court thereby distinguished Shaffer" because
the property providing the quasi in rem jurisdiction in Shaffer was
completely unrelated to the asserted claim." Accordingly, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court again affirmed the trial court's decision."s For
the second time, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States, where the Minnesota judgment was again reversed.'
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,"0 addressed the issue of
whether a state may constitutionally exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction
over a defendant who has no forum contacts by attaching the contrac-
tual obligation of his insurer who is licensed to do business in the
state.' The Court looked to the due process standards set forth in In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Washington" and Shaffer v. Heitner3' as con-
trolling. According to the rules enunciated in these two cases, the ex-
ercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction over nonresident defendants must
be judged on the basis of the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation. This relationship must be indicative of cer-
tain minimum contacts with the forum. 32
Applying these criteria, the majority observed that Rush never had
any contacts with Minnesota, and the accident at issue had occurred in
Indiana. The only premise offered by the plaintiff to support the
20. Id. at 212. See note 78 infra.
21. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 496, 272 N.W.2d 888 (1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
22. Id. at 497, 272 N.W.2d at 888.
23. Id. at 503, 272 N.W.2d at 892.
24. Id. at 502-03, 272 N.W.2d at 891-92.
25. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208-09.
26. 311 Minn. at 496, 272 N.W.2d at 888.
27. 444 U.S. at 333. On the same day that Rush was decided, the Court handed down
the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), holding
that minimum contacts were lacking for a state's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over
foreign salesmen.
28. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist joined in Justice Marshall's majority opinion. Justices Brennan and Stevens filed
separate opinions in dissent.
29. 444 U.S. at 322.
30. 326 U.S 310 (1945) (due process requires that the defendant have certain
minimum contacts with the forum).
31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
32. 444 U.S. at 327.
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jurisdiction of the Minnesota court was that Rush's insurance company
conducted business within the state." The insurance policy, although
related to the negligence action, was not the subject matter of the ac-
tion. The Court concluded that this contact alone was insufficent to
support jurisdiction." The Court recognized that the ownership of
property within a state may suggest the presence of other ties;"
however, in this case, the defendant's ownership of a debt in the forum
was not indicative of further contacts between the defendant and the
forum. State Farm's decision to conduct business in Minnesota was
completely unrelated to Rush.0 Accordingly, the mere existence of
State Farm's insurance obligation was not a sufficient basis for the
jurisdiction of the Minnesota court over Rush.
Having concluded that Minnesota could not justify assertion of
jurisdiction over Rush based upon the minimum contacts analysis, the
Court next addressed the theory that the attachment of the insurer's
obligation was the functional equivalent of a direct action against the
insurer.' This theory emphasizes the primary role of the insurer in the
defense of the action, portraying the role of the insured as nominal
because his liability is limited to the value of the insurance policy.
39
The Rush Court refused to recognize such an attachment as a direct
action equivalent because the insurer's entry into the case is depen-
dent upon the state's ability under the Constitution to assume jurisdic-
tion over the insured.
Justice Marshall concluded the opinion by observing that the Min-
nesota court had shifted the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry from the
33. Id. at 327-28. The Court noted that the state had combined two legal fictions in
assuming quasi in rem jurisdiction over Rush, a nonresident: the legal fiction that a debt
can be garnished where the debtor is found was combined with the legal fiction that a cor-
poration is present for jurisdictional purposes wherever it is found. Id. at 328.
34. Id. at 329-30.
35. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 209.
36. 444 U.S. at 328-29. The majority believed it unlikely that Rush could have ex-
pected his purchase of insurance in Indiana to subject him to suit in any state where a
future plaintiff might decide to relocate. Id. at 329.
37. Id. at 329-30.
38. Id. at 330. A direct action statute authorizes a lawsuit against the tortfeasor's in-
surer directly without involving the tortfeasor. See Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 68 n.4 (1954) (upholding Louisiana direct action statute). In
those states which have enacted direct action statutes, some contact with the forum other
than power over the insurer and residence of the injured party is required. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978) (accident occurring within the state); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
26, § 2003(1) (1976) (accident occurring within the jurisdiction); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2
(1979) (action on policy issued within the state when the assured cannot be served locally).
39. 444 U.S. at 330.
40. Id. at 330-31. The Court also cast doubt on the premise that an insured has no
real stake in the litigation. Id. at 331 n.20.
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relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation to the
relationship among the plaintiff, the forum, and the insurer. This sub-
tle shift of focus placed greater emphasis upon the plaintiff's contacts
with the forum than the defendant's." The Court deemed such an ap-
proach to be contrary to the rules laid down by International Shoe and
its progeny. The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court was re-
versed for the second time.42
Justice Stevens, dissenting in a brief opinion,43 argued for the adop-
tion of the direct action theory.4 In his estimation, the rule of Shaffer,
which precludes quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
where his property within the forum is completely unrelated to the
litigation, does not also preclude the assertion of such jurisdiction
where the property is related to the litigation.'4 Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction is legitimate
where the plaintiff is a forum resident and the state assumes no power
over the individual defendant, dealing only with his debt present
within the state.4'
Justice Brennan, dissenting in a separately reported opinion," found
the Court's interpretation of International Shoe and its progeny unac-
ceptable. He advocated a broader reading of International Shoe,
limiting the exercise of state court jurisdiction only where it offends
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice . 8 His reading of
International Shoe emphasized fairness and reasonableness as the key
determinant of jurisdiction, with forum contacts serving only to aid in
the determination of fairness and reasonableness. 9 Applying this test,
Justice Brennan found Minnesota's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion neither unfair nor unreasonable. Because the insurer controlled
the defense, Rush was not burdened by the imposition of out-of-state
jurisdiction." Even if the minimum contacts analysis were controlling,
Justice Brennan believed that the requisite contacts between the
defendant and the forum were present because Rush took advantage of
a nationwide insurance network by choosing State Farm as his
carrier."
41. Id. at 332.
42. Id. at 332-33.
43. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
45. 444 U.S. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 333-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 299 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
48. Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan continued by questioning the reliance on Interna-
tional Shoe as jurisdictional precedent.2 Citing the increased nation-
alization of commerce and ease of transportation and communication,
he reasoned that the Court's preoccupation with the rights of the
defendant is no longer justified. Justice Brennan argued that the in-
terests of the forum state and parties other than the defendant are en-
titled to as much weight as those of the defendant.,3
A close analysis of the case law defining state court jurisdiction
reveals that the conclusion reached by the majority of the Rush Court
is consistent with the precedent in this area. The body of law from
which the conflict in Rush evolved has its roots in Pennoyer v. Neff'
where the Supreme Court formulated the constitutional basis for state
court jurisdiction. Emphasizing the territorial nature of a state's
power, the Pennoyer Court recognized the principle that each state
maintains exclusive jurisdiction over persons or property within its
territory." This dichotomy between persons and property gave rise to
two classifications of state court jurisdiction: (1) in personam jurisdic-
tion, based upon the state's direct authority over the defendant and
service of process upon the defendant within the forum state;57 and (2)
in rem jurisdiction, based upon the state's authority over property
within the forum state where the action is brought to determine the in-
terests of all persons in that property." Although the distinction be-
tween these two classes of jurisdiction was recognized prior to Pen-
52. Id. at 307-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer, Mitchell had obtained a judgment in Oregon
against Neff for collection of attorney's fees at a time when Neff was neither a resident
nor a property owner of that state. When Neff later acquired property in Oregon, Mit-
chell used it to acquire jurisdiction over Neff pursuant to Oregon law, giving notice by
publication. Neff did not appear and a default judgment was entered against him. Pen-
noyer purchased the land in question at a sheriffs sale held to satisfy the judgment
against Neff. Neff brought an ejectment action in the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Oregon against Pennoyer challenging the validity of jurisdiction in the prior ac-
tion. The district court rejected the validity of Mitchell's judgment and awarded the prop-
erty to Neff. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 733-36.
55. See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
241.
56. 95 U.S. at 722.
57. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 199. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. at 316; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720. See also note 6 supra.
58. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 199 & n.17. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. at 246-48; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722-23. See also note 7 supra. The terri-
toriality approach of Pennoyer remained good law until Shaffer, where the Supreme
Court held that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be supported by the same
minimum contacts required of in personam jurisdiction. 433 U.S. at 212.
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noyer, it was this case which first raised the dichotomy to a constitu-
tionally significant level. 9
The territorial approach to state court jurisdiction formulated in
Pennoyer remained essentially unchanged" until International Shoe
Co. v. Washington." The Court in International Shoe abandoned the
concept of territorial authority in in personam jurisdiction and adopted
a broader theory requiring that the defendant have certain minimum
contacts with the forum such that the state's exercise of jurisdiction
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.2
A third classification of state court jurisdiction, denoted quasi in
rem, is based upon the state's authority over property situated within
the forum state and consists of two distinct types of actions. 3 In the
first, the plaintiff seeks to assert his rights in the designated property
as superior to those of the defendant.6 This form of quasi in rem pro-
ceeding developed as a variation of the pure in rem proceeding and is
often broadly designated in rem because both types of actions arise
from the property forming the basis for jurisdiction. 5
59. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional? 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Zammit].
60. In Pennoyer, Justice Field noted certain exceptions to the territorialist theory of
jurisdiction. Actions involving personal status of the plaintiff, such as divorce, could be ad-
judicated in the plaintiffs home state even though the defendant could not be personally
served there. 95 U.S. at 733-35. The Court also approved the legal fiction that a corpora-
tion impliedly consents to suit by conducting business within a state. Id. at 735-36. This
same reasoning was later applied to achieve jurisdiction over an out-of-state motorist who
used the state's highways. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
61. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the State of Washington had asserted
in personam jurisdiction over the International Shoe Company in a suit to collect
unemployment taxes. The International Shoe Company was a Delaware corporation whose
principal place of business was St. Louis, Missouri. All manufacturing facilities were
located outside Washington. For the years in question, International Shoe employed be-
tween 11 and 13 Washington residents, under the supervision and control of the St. Louis
office, to act as salesmen. Each salesman was supplied with samples and conducted sales
operations without a permanent location. No contracts for sale or purchase were made in
Washington. Id. at 313-14. Striking down the rule that a defendant must be present in the
forum to be subject to personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that due process re-
quired only that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. Id. at 316. The Court found that the defendant's acts in systematically conducting
business under the protection of the laws of Washington constituted such contact as to
make the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable and just. Id. at 320.
62. Id. at 316.
63. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 199 & n.17. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. at 246-48. See generally Zammit, note 59 supra. See also note 7 supra.
64. 433 U.S. at 199 n.17. This category includes such proceedings as actions to
foreclose liens on real property and forfeiture proceedings for transgression of the custom
laws. Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600, 615 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Smit].
65. Smit, supra note 64, at 615 & n.55.
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In the second type of quasi in rem action, the plaintiff seeks to apply
property of the nonresident defendant to the satisfaction of a claim
which is wholly unrelated to that property. 8 This type of proceeding
developed gradually into its present form independent of the develop-
ment of in rem proceedings." In Harris v. Balk,"8 the Court extended
the concept of attachable property to include intangibles, holding that
a debt owed by a third party to the defendant was present wherever
the debtor was present and consequently could be attached in any
forum in which the debtor was found. 9 This concept was used by the
New York Court of Appeals in fashioning the unique jurisdictional
theory presented in Seider v. Roth."
The plaintiffs in Seider were New York residents who suffered in-
juries in an automobile accident in Vermont, allegedly as a result of
the negligence of the defendant, a citizen of Canada. The plaintiffs
sought to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching the contrac-
tual obligation of the defendant's insurer to defend and indemnify the
defendant under a policy of automobile liability insurance. In con-
cluding that the plaintiffs could validly compel the defendant to defend
in New York by attaching the contractual obligation, the court of ap-
peals found that the obligation constituted an attachable debt under
New York law." The court, by its finding, created the theoretical basis
for the quasi in rem jurisdiction asserted in Rush.2
66. Id. at 615.
67. Id. See generally C. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES § 4 (6th ed. 1885), noted in Smit, supra note 64, at 615 n.56. The Pen-
noyer Court spoke approvingly of the possibility of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 95 U.S. at
733.
68. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
69. Id. at 225-26. Harris, a resident of North Carolina, owed money to Balk, also a
resident of North Carolina. Epstein, a resident of Maryland, had a claim against Balk.
When Harris happened to be in Maryland, Epstein garnished his debt to Balk. Harris did
not contest the action and paid the debt to Epstein. When Balk later sued Harris in North
Carolina, Harris pleaded the Maryland judgment in satisfaction. The Supreme Court held
the Maryland garnishment valid and Harris' debt discharged. Id. at 226.
70. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
71. Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Judge Burke, in his dissent,
pointed out the bootstrap nature of the reasoning relied upon by the majority. Quite simply,
the asserted jurisdiction was based upon a promise which did not mature until jurisdiction
was established. Id. at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103. This problem did not
arise in Rush because Minnesota law made the insurer's obligation attachable. 444 U.S. at
328 n.14.
Seider-type jurisdiction has been rejected on the basis of state law or constitutional
grounds in California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. Id. at 327 n.13.
72. Seider-type jurisdiction was adopted by only two states other than New York.
Minnesota adopted Seider jurisdiction statutorily. New Hampshire courts recognized
Seider jurisdiction where the defendant was a resident of a forum which had adopted
Seider jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 326-27.
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Since the creation of the Seider doctrine by the New York Court of
Appeals, its constitutionality has been sustained on two independent
theories: the theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction; and the theory of a
judicially-created direct action. Most courts have relied simultaneously
upon both theories to sustain the Seider doctrine. The New York
Court of Appeals sustained the constitutionality of Seider in Simpson
v. Loehmann,3 relying primarily on a quasi in rem theory and finding
the insurer's contractual obligation to be a local property interest sub-
ject to attachment.' Although the court denied that it was creating a
direct action, it emphasized the controlling role of the insurer in the
defense as further justification for its action. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first con-
sidered the Seider doctrine in Minichiello v. Rosenberg." The majority
opinion by Judge Friendly relied almost exclusively on the direct ac-
tion theory in sustaining Seider's constitutionality. On rehearing, the
court cited Harris v. Balk as support for the quasi in rem theory of an
attachable debt present in the forum.77
The Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer 8 followed Seider by eleven
years and raised significant questions about the validity of the quasi in
rem jurisdiction imposed by the Seider court. 9 The Shaffer Court
73. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), rehearing denied, 21
N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
74. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
75. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
76. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
77. 410 F.2d at 117, 118-19.
78. In Shaffer, Heitner had filed a shareholder's derivative suit in Delaware against
Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation, its subsidiary, and 28 present or former
officers and directors of the corporation. The suit alleged activities resulting in antitrust
liability which amounted to breach of duty. Heitner also filed a motion to sequester the
nonresident defendants' stock in Greyhound Corporation. Although none of the cer-
tificates of ownership was present in Delaware, the situs of ownership under Delaware
law was Delaware. 433 U.S. at 189-92. The Supreme Court overturned Delaware's asser-
tion of quasi in rem jurisdiction over the nonresident corporate fiduciaries where the
basis for jurisdiction over the nonresidents was the presence of their stock in the forum.
The Court held that the standards of fairness set forth in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), see note 61 supra, should rule actions in rem and quasi
in rem as well as actions in personam. 433 U.S. at 212. Consequently, a state may exercise
quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if he has certain minimum
contacts with the forum. Id
79. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the post-
Shaffer constitutionality of Seider jurisdiction in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579
F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978). The court relied upon both the quasi
in rem theory and the direct action theory to sustain Seider-type jurisdiction. Although
the direct action nature of the arguments was not expressed, the court found the control-
ling role of the insurer and the nominal burden on the defendant to be important. The
quasi in rem theory was asserted when the court distinguished Shaffer on the basis of the
1980
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recognized that jurisdiction over property is actually jurisdiction over
the interests of a person in the property." Based on this premise, the
Court extended the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe
and its progeny to encompass actions in rem and quasi in rem as well
as in personam.8' The Shaffer Court held that the mere presence of the
defendant's property in the state was insufficient to support the state's
jurisdiction, although the presence of this property might suggest the
existence of other contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation.82 Where, as in Shaffer,3 the property attached is completely
unrelated to the asserted cause of action, the property's presence does
not suggest other contacts and an assertion of jurisdiction cannot be
justified."
In applying the minimum contacts analysis demanded by Interna-
tional Shoe and Shaffer, the Rush Court was consistent with the
Court's prior constructions of that test. 5 Savchuk asserted that the in-
surer's obligation was property related to the cause of action and,
thus, was distinguishable from the property in Shaffer which was com-
pletely unrelated to the asserted claim.8 This argument, however, does
not support Minnesota's assertion of jurisdiction, for the heart of the
jurisdictional analysis is the triad of contacts among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation. 7 The presence of the defendant's property
within the forum constitutes a contact between the defendant and the
forum, but one which is insufficient to support jurisdiction by itself."
debt attached. In Shaffer the debt was completely unrelated to the cause of action. In
O'Connor the court found a unique relationship between the insurer's contractual obliga-
tion and the litigation. Id. at 198-99.
80. 433 U.S. at 207.
81. Id. at 212.
82. Id. at 209.
83. The Shaffer Court spoke of three types of relationships between the property
and the cause of action. Where the property is the source of the underlying controversy,
jurisdiction may be acquired by attaching the property. The Court'stated that presence of
the property may favor jurisdiction where the cause of action is related to rights and
duties growing out of ownership of the property, as in injury suffered on land of a
nonresident. Finally, the Court stated that jurisdiction is not justified where the property
is completely unrelated to the cause of action. Id. at 207-08.
84. Id. at 209.
85. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (attachment of nonresident defendants'
stock in a locally chartered corporation is insufficient contact to support quasi in rem
jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (domicile within the forum of settlor
and most of the parties is insufficient contact to support in personam jurisdiction over
nonresident trustee); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (foreign
corporation conducting limited sales operation within the forum has sufficient contacts to
support in personam jurisdiction).
86. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 3.
87. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
88. 433 U.S. at 209.
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The role of the relationship between the defendant's property and the
cause of action is one of utility, that is, to point to the existence of ad-
ditional contacts that might exist within the triad." Where no addi-
tional contacts are suggested by the existence of the property within
the forum, appropriate minimum contacts are lacking and the assertion
of jurisdiction is void. Thus, the Rush Court's conclusion that the at-
tached property must be either the subject matter of the action or
related to the operative facts of the negligence action" is consistent
with Shaffer.
The Rush Court concluded that Seider actions are not the equivalent
of direct actions. In a direct action, the plaintiff need only acquire valid
in personam jurisdiction over the insurer. In a Seider action, valid
jurisdiction must be obtained over the defendant-tortfeasor before the
insurer may be brought into the action.2 The question left unanswered
by the Court is whether a direct action statute granting a cause of ac-
tion against the insurer without regard to the insured's contacts with
the forum is consistent with due process. 3 This issue did not confront
the Court in Rush. A combination of several factors, however, suggests
that this question may well arise in the future. The first of these fac-
tors is the Court's opinion in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp.9 The primary issue considered in Watson was whether the
United States Constitution forbids Louisiana to apply its own law and
compels it to apply the law of the state where the insurance contract
was formed or the state in which the corporate defendant was incor-
porated. 5 In sustaining the constitutionality of Louisiana's direct ac-
tion statute, the Watson Court concluded that Louisiana's interest in
caring for those injured within the forum outweighed the interest of
Massachusetts in safeguarding the freedom of contract among its resi-
dents.98 Although the Louisiana statute required that the injury occur
within the forum,97 the Watson Court did not discuss the nature of the
contacts between the parties and the forum constitutionally required
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for a valid direct action statute. 8 As a result, the reasoning used by the
Watson Court in sustaining the direct action statute has been inter-
preted by some as suggesting that a Seider-type direct action statute
is constitutionally valid," while others reach the opposite conclusion. 1
The second of the factors suggesting that the Court may someday
have to consider the constitutionality of a Seider-type direct action
statute is the importance attached by the courts of New York and the
Second Circuit to the direct action theory in sustaining Seider jurisdic-
tion."1 Implicit in the justification of a Seider action based on an
analogy to a direct action is the assumption that a direct action statute
which grants a cause of action against the insurer in Seider situations
is constitutional in light of Watson. The absence of any discussion of
this issue by the Rush Court leaves room for the interpretation that
such a statute is indeed constitutional. In view of the extended effort
required to dispel Seider from the judicial arena, it is not altogether
unlikely that a Seider-type direct action statute will one day confront
the Court.
Despite the opinion's lack of discussion of direct action statutes, it is
difficult to conceive how merely changing the origin of a legal result
can remedy its due process transgressions. In Shaffer the Court in-
dicated that if a direct. assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
would violate the Constitution, an indirect assertion of that jurisdiction
would be equally impermissible."2 It would seem that a direct action
statute granting a cause of action against the insurer without regard
to the minimum contacts among the tortfeasor, the forum, and the
litigation amounts to little more than an indirect assertion of jurisdic-
tion over the tortfeasor and, thus, is unconstitutional.
The Rush Court completed a job begun several years before by the
Shaffer Court, putting a resolute end to the Seider doctrine. As
98. Justice Black, writing for the majority, emphasized that Louisiana had a substan-
tial interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured in Louisiana. 348 U.S. at 72-73.
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argument that Louisiana's direct action statute would not have been constitutional had
the injury in Watson occurred outside the forum. Justice Black also made a statement,
however, which could be interpreted as implying that an economic interest on the part of
Louisiana, as in compensating a hospital for treatment of an accident victim, would be suf-
ficient to sustain the validity of the direct action statute. See id. at 72.
99. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d at 110; Note, Judicially Enacted Direct
Action Statutes: Soundness of the New York Rule, 10 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 711,
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jurisdictional case law, Rush is foreshadowed by International Shoe
and Shaffer because it does little more than reaffirm and perhaps
strengthen the minimum contacts doctrine announced therein. The im-
portance of the case lies in its conclusive rejection of the remnants of
the Seider doctrine which had survived Shaffer.
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